Amid the drumbeat of war and conflict, it’s easy to overlook more subtle geopolitical shifts. One such shift occurred in November, when Vietnam elevated its partnerships with Algeria, Kuwait, and South Africa following visits by Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh to the three countries. At first glance, this may seem like a nothingburger: After all, Hanoi has been upgrading partnerships with various countries and maintains many such partnerships around the world.
However, Vietnam’s latest moves are different due to the current geopolitical climate and Hanoi’s changing foreign-policy priorities. For one, it seeks to lessen its overdependence on economic and security collaboration with China and the United States. And next month, the Communist Party of Vietnam will hold its quinquennial national congress to determine potential changes to the national leadership and approve plans for all areas of statecraft over the next five years. On foreign policy, the party has adopted a new slogan—“core, frequent”—to describe the critical role of diplomacy in continuously advancing Vietnam’s interests as a rising middle power. Put another way, Vietnam’s national security greatly and perhaps existentially depends on effective diplomacy, especially as intensifying U.S.-China competition threatens to destabilize the region and endanger Hanoi’s national interests.
Amid the drumbeat of war and conflict, it’s easy to overlook more subtle geopolitical shifts. One such shift occurred in November, when Vietnam elevated its partnerships with Algeria, Kuwait, and South Africa following visits by Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh to the three countries. At first glance, this may seem like a nothingburger: After all, Hanoi has been upgrading partnerships with various countries and maintains many such partnerships around the world.
However, Vietnam’s latest moves are different due to the current geopolitical climate and Hanoi’s changing foreign-policy priorities. For one, it seeks to lessen its overdependence on economic and security collaboration with China and the United States. And next month, the Communist Party of Vietnam will hold its quinquennial national congress to determine potential changes to the national leadership and approve plans for all areas of statecraft over the next five years. On foreign policy, the party has adopted a new slogan—“core, frequent”—to describe the critical role of diplomacy in continuously advancing Vietnam’s interests as a rising middle power. Put another way, Vietnam’s national security greatly and perhaps existentially depends on effective diplomacy, especially as intensifying U.S.-China competition threatens to destabilize the region and endanger Hanoi’s national interests.
From this perspective, it is remarkable that Vietnam has established new strategic partnerships so far afield. For one, these are the first African and Middle Eastern nations to receive such close engagement as Vietnam seeks new trade and other deals. More broadly, this behavior fits a pattern of Hanoi seeking to diversify its foreign relations in recent years—not just beyond Southeast Asia but also beyond the Indo-Pacific—because of deep worries about its current ability to weather great-power competition.
As I previously wrote for Foreign Policy, Vietnam joined BRICS as a partner nation in June to explore alternative economic channels. That decision was groundbreaking because Hanoi has traditionally declined to participate in multilateral forums outside the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, primarily to avoid the appearance of aligning with outside powers. Additionally, over the last four years, Hanoi has significantly expanded its list of comprehensive strategic partnerships—the highest tier in its foreign-policy hierarchy—to include 14 countries. From 2008 to 2016, Vietnam maintained only three such partnerships—with China, India, and Russia. However, starting in 2022, Hanoi opened the floodgates and signed comprehensive strategic partnerships with 11 more countries, including the United States and other major powers, such as Australia, France, Japan, South Korea, and, most recently, the United Kingdom. Hanoi is clearly seeking new outlets for collaboration that can help it break free from its overdependence on Beijing.
Although Vietnam is pursuing a global diversification strategy in an attempt to escape the trap of U.S.-China conflict, it’s simultaneously hedging with these same great powers. For example, in July, Vietnam conducted joint army drills with China for the first time—a notable development given that Vietnamese defense policy typically forbids such activities. During U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s visit to Hanoi last month, the two countries agreed to strengthen defense cooperation through delegation exchanges at all levels, as well as joint training, military medicine, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, defense industry cooperation, and cybersecurity. Vietnam will likely stick to its decades-old pledge to “make more friends, fewer enemies” and to simultaneously “cooperate and struggle” to avoid antagonizing or becoming overly dependent on the United States, China, or both.
Furthermore, Vietnamese General Secretary To Lam and the Communist Party have labeled the next five-year period an “era of national rise,” meaning that Hanoi seeks accelerated growth, reform, modernization, innovation, and the expansion of its global influence. Much of this agenda has a domestic focus, but growth and modernization at home will inevitably be enablers of a more active and diversified foreign policy. And that will build on Vietnam’s growing international relevance as a rising middle power: According to the Lowy Institute’s 2025 Asia Power Index, Vietnam made the second-biggest annual jump of the 27 countries tracked by the index and now ranks as the 12th most powerful country in the region.
Vietnam’s foreign policy of forming new strategic partnerships to avoid dependency on great powers isn’t new. What is new is the intensity of Hanoi’s current approach and outreach well beyond the Indo-Pacific. This suggests that Vietnamese leadership believes that its previous strategy was insufficient to mitigate the potential fallout of deepening great-power competition.
This trend has important policy implications for the Trump administration’s relationship with Vietnam and its broader strategy in the Indo-Pacific. Although Hanoi will continue to seek closer collaboration with Washington on defense, including against China, this collaboration may be limited as Hanoi looks to alternative partnerships to avoid overdependence on the United States. Hanoi may also choose to strengthen ties with Beijing as a balance against an unpredictable and seemingly erratic Washington, which upended years of growing closeness by slapping a 46 percent tariff on U.S. imports of Vietnamese goods in April before eventually agreeing on 20 percent.
Hanoi’s evolving strategy means that the Trump administration could find it difficult to engage Vietnam in the future. One workaround for Washington could be to leverage U.S. allies and partners that have relations with Hanoi, especially the countries on the latter’s diversification list. That would mean indirect cooperation with Vietnam through friendly nations in the region, such as Australia, India, Japan, and Singapore. Another approach would be to de-emphasize great-power competition during U.S.-Vietnam negotiations. Fortunately, the Trump administration is already trying this approach. For example, the two countries have continued to collaborate on war legacy issues, such as Agent Orange removal and determining the fate of still-missing soldiers and civilians.
The reality, however, is that great-power competition remains at the forefront of Washington’s thinking and planning. Vietnam will continue to feel pressured and subject to the capricious whims of this competition. No one can reasonably blame Vietnam for responding accordingly.
