Even in an administration that has been full of surprises, Donald Trump’s pivot to Pakistan has stood out.
The U.S. president has developed a close relationship with senior Pakistani leadership, including the country’s powerful military chief, Asim Munir—whom he hosted at the White House in June and again in September—and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, whom he has met three times this year.
Trump has praised both men, describing them as “great people” in a speech at a summit in Southeast Asia in October. “I love Pakistan,” Trump said before hosting Munir in June.
Sharif and Munir have also showered Trump with praise, endorsing his quest for a Nobel Peace Prize both formally and informally at least half a dozen times. “You’re the man this world needed most at this point in time,” Sharif told Trump in October in Egypt, where the two men had gathered with several other leaders to formalize the Gaza cease-fire agreement.
Countries around the world have adopted a variety of strategies to navigate Trump’s second term—a spectrum ranging from flattery to uneasy coexistence to outright defiance—with varying degrees of success. There is a widespread recognition that Pakistan has managed to play its cards more successfully than most.
“The Pakistanis have done a very good job of developing a positive relationship with President Trump,” a former U.S. diplomat who served during Trump’s first term told Foreign Policy, requesting anonymity to speak candidly.
“They’ve gamed Trump’s personality,” said Husain Haqqani, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute who served as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States from 2008 to 2011. “They gave him the praise that he wanted.”
Pakistan’s current ambassador to Washington, Rizwan Saeed Sheikh, described Islamabad’s approach thus: “It’s persona, priorities, policy—in that order.”
Beyond the fondness for alliteration, however, it’s instructive to look at not only how Pakistan made the most of what it had—silver-tongued leaders and critical mineral reserves, for starters—but also how it made up for disadvantages in other areas by hiring lobbyists close to Trump and by exploiting his interest in cryptocurrencies. Crucially, all of this has come as Trump’s ties with the country’s geopolitical archrival, India, have frayed, upending a decades-long trend line in South Asia.
Computers stand next a wall covered with signs and under a transit shelter. Above them is a large billboard with a depiction of Munir in military dress uniform.
Commuters await transport near a billboard featuring Pakistan Chief of the Army Staff Gen. Asim Munir, along a street in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, on May 14. Farooq Naeem/AFP via Getty Images
During a speech in Egypt in October, Trump called Munir his “favorite field marshal”—a knowing reference to the fact that Munir had become only the second Pakistani to hold that title. “Trump likes people who are in charge of their countries and he likes strongmen, said Haqqani. “Field Marshal Munir is very much in that category.”
Pakistan has spent big to figure out what else Trump likes. Islamabad shelled out millions of dollars earlier this year to hire multiple lobbying firms run by some of Trump’s former associates. (It’s also hired multiple external PR firms, one of which helped facilitate FP’s interview with the country’s current ambassador.)
But Pakistan’s earliest win with Trump came in February, when it helped the United States arrest Mohammad Sharifullah, the mastermind of a 2021 suicide bombing in Kabul during the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan that killed 13 U.S. service members and around 170 Afghan civilians. “I want to thank, especially, the government of Pakistan for helping arrest this monster,” Trump said while addressing a joint session of Congress in early March, referring to Sharifullah.
Trump’s gratefulness represented a significant departure from his first term in office, when in 2018 he accused Pakistani leaders of “lies & deceit” before suspending most military aid to the South Asian country. “They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help,” he wrote at the time. However, later in his term, Trump developed a rapport with then-Prime Minister Imran Khan, meeting him first in 2019 and again in 2020, when Trump described Khan as his “very good friend.”
President Joe Biden reverted to isolating and sidelining Pakistan, breaking with precedent by not calling Khan after he entered the White House. (Khan was ousted in 2022 and jailed the following year, where he is now serving a 14-year sentence.)
The Afghanistan operation in March 2025 gave Islamabad a chance to break the mold.
“That was the immediate tactical win they wanted to give Trump, and showcase that Pakistan has things of value and then build on the relationship from there,” said Uzair Younus, a principal at the Asia Group in Washington, D.C.
While playing to the U.S. president’s personality has been an important facet of Pakistan’s Trump 2.0 game plan, Islamabad has also offered him tangible avenues—“things of value”—to further some of his key strategic priorities.
Chief among those is critical minerals. Trump has been on a global quest for the five dozen elements that help power a host of consumer and military technologies and whose supply chain China largely controls and has been increasingly willing to weaponize in trade negotiations. Despite being one of China’s closest allies, Pakistan has given Washington what it wants. The Frontier Works Organization, a key engineering branch of the Pakistani military, signed a $500 million deal with the firm U.S. Strategic Metals in September to deliver minerals such as copper and antimony to the United States from Pakistani deposits that are estimated to span more than 230,000 square miles.
“On critical minerals, the Pakistanis had put in the long yards strategically,” Younus said.
Pakistan’s effort to leverage its mineral wealth does predate Trump by several decades. Balochistan, the country’s largest but most volatile province, is home to vast reserves of gold, copper, and other minerals estimated to be worth billions of dollars, but Western efforts to tap those reserves have gotten mired in yearslong legal disputes. The most prominent example of that was Reko Diq, a large gold and copper reserve that was the subject of multiple court challenges and international arbitration involving Australian, Chilean, and Canadian companies that led to its development being put on hold in 2011.
Khan’s government sought to revive the mine in 2022, agreeing to a settlement with Canadian mining company Barrick Gold that gave the company a 50 percent share of the business. Earlier this year, the World Bank’s private-sector investment arm, the International Finance Corporation, agreed to provide at least $300 million in financing to the project, and Barrick signed a $440 million deal for mining equipment with Japanese conglomerate Komatsu, which said it would make most of that equipment in the United States.
In April this year, the Trump administration also sent an interagency delegation led by the State Department to the Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum in Islamabad.
All those efforts sent a “very clear signal” that “come what may, the preference of Pakistan was to work with the West on this mine,” Younus added. “That framework opened the door for Donald Trump and others in the administration to say [that] perhaps Pakistan is willing to walk the talk on critical minerals.”
Trump and Sharif sit in brocade gold chairs and are seen from behind and above. In front of them are Vance, Rubio, and Munir on two couches. Photographers take photos and a desk is seen in the background.
In a photo released by the White House, Trump and Sharif talk alongside U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Pakistan’s Munir in the Oval Office on Sept. 25.White House photographer
Four men standing around an open box with minerals in it.
A photo released by the White House shows Munir presenting critical minerals to Trump in the Oval Office on Sept. 25.White House photographer
Here, too, there has been an element of pomp and showmanship. When Sharif and Munir visited the White House in September, they brought a collection of rock samples to show Trump.
Another area of U.S.-Pakistan cooperation that has received significant attention is cryptocurrency. The Trump administration has elevated the crypto industry significantly over the past year, creating a strategic reserve for some digital currencies and pledging to make the United States the “crypto capital of the world.”
Trump also launched his own crypto company, World Liberty Financial, in September 2024—weeks before being elected president—along with Steve Witkoff, who is now his administration’s Middle East envoy. Trump and Witkoff are both currently listed as “co-founder emeritus” on the company’s website, with Trump’s three sons and Witkoff’s two sons listed among seven other co-founders.
The Trump family’s businesses have netted hundreds of millions of dollars through the company’s overseas deals—including with multiple governments—and initiatives such as the issuing of a $TRUMP “meme coin.” Trump has brushed aside conflict and ethics concerns. “My sons are involved in crypto much more than I,” he said in an interview with 60 Minutes in late October. “You know, they’re running a business, they’re not in government. And they’re good.”
The Pakistani government has also seized on crypto as a potential pathway out of its long-running economic woes, attempting to legalize and formalize digital currencies by launching the Pakistan Crypto Council in March, chaired by the country’s finance minister.
A flurry of U.S. engagement followed. In April, the council signed a letter of intent with World Liberty Financial “to accelerate blockchain innovation, stablecoin adoption, and decentralized finance integration across Pakistan.” In perhaps an unusual level of engagement for a private company, Witkoff’s son Zach and other executives met with Sharif, Munir, and several other officials including the ministers of information and defense “to formalize cooperation,” according to a Pakistani government readout of the meeting.
The Pakistan Crypto Council’s CEO, Bilal Bin Saqib, was named Pakistan’s minister for crypto and blockchain in May, and he subsequently announced at a crypto conference in Las Vegas that Pakistan would establish its own strategic reserve for the cryptocurrency bitcoin.
Sheikh, the Pakistani ambassador, described the cryptocurrency links as one of several areas of engagement with the Trump administration. “The intent had always been there, but the content was being added through mutual consultation, mutual convenience, and, of course, mutual interest,” he said. “We are charting it out on minerals, on crypto, on energy, on counterterrorism, health, and education.”
However, Younus argued that despite the attention, the impact of cryptocurrency ties on the U.S.-Pakistan relationship was being overestimated. “Obviously, when Zach Witkoff visits Pakistan and talks about crypto or Bilal Bin Saqib comes and meets people in the White House around crypto, then something’s afoot, but it’s been overblown in terms of its influence,” he said.
“What the government wants to do is find a way to bring in exchanges to formalize this sector,” Younus added. “Whether it’s the Trump family or others who want to build this in Pakistan, if you want to come in here and talk about crypto and you’re already registered and operating in the West, we’re open for business.”
Two students hold a poster depicting Munir and Trump with a U.S. flag. The poster reads: “Alert President Trump: Remind America’s enemy Laden was hidden in Pakistan.”
Students hold a poster depicting Munir and Trump in Mumbai on Aug. 8. Ashish Vaishnav/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images
Pakistan’s ascendancy in Trump’s second administration has coincided with a cooling in Washington’s relationship with Islamabad’s biggest rival, India.
Trump slapped India with some of the highest tariffs in the world—increasing them to 50 percent over New Delhi’s decision to keep purchasing Russian oil amid the Ukraine war—and has been uncharacteristically critical of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Much of that animus flowed from a weeklong conflict between India and Pakistan in early May, following a terrorist attack in Indian-controlled Kashmir that New Delhi accused Islamabad of orchestrating. Indian retaliatory airstrikes escalated into the two nuclear-armed neighbors’ biggest clash in years before a sudden cease-fire four days later.
Trump claimed credit for that cease-fire in a Truth Social post, rankling India, which eschews any international mediation in its relationship with Pakistan and has continued to insist that the two sides deescalated bilaterally. Pakistan, on the other hand, gave Trump full credit and became the first country to officially recommend him for the Nobel Peace Prize.
Sheikh said that Pakistan heard from several countries during the conflict, including Arab Gulf countries and Turkey, but “the actual facilitation that finally counted was by [Trump] and his administration.”
The U.S. president played a “very positive and salutary role in bringing about that cease-fire,” the Pakistani ambassador added, citing as evidence the fact that “the world came to know of it” through Trump’s post.
Despite the significant divergences in Trump’s attitude toward the two neighbors, however, Haqqani argues that U.S. policy toward either of them hasn’t shifted seismically.
“Trump is annoyed with India over not having the kind of trade deal he wanted, and he’s also annoyed with Modi for not having the ‘generosity’ to give him credit when he wanted it,” he said. “But substantively, all the factors that made the U.S. and India partners over the last two decades are all still there.”
For Pakistan, meanwhile, more substantial economic or military assistance is unlikely to materialize despite the bonhomie. “Pakistan always looks for economic assistance, [but] it’s not going to get any because Trump is not giving economic assistance to anybody,” Haqqani added. “Yes, the U.S will be less critical of Pakistan publicly, that’s a political advantage. Yes, the U.S. will probably work with Pakistan on Afghanistan, but that probably they were already doing. I don’t see any big-ticket military items being sold to Pakistan anytime soon.”
The India-U.S. relationship has also ticked back upward in recent weeks with the signing of a 10-year bilateral defense pact and the confirmation of prominent Trump acolyte Sergio Gor as the new U.S. ambassador to New Delhi. While the tariffs remain in place and a trade deal remains elusive, Trump has also softened his tone toward Modi.
“He’s a friend of mine,” the U.S. president said of the Indian leader early last month.
A crowd holding signs with one person holding an Indian flag.
Protesters hold placards claiming U.S. interference in the India-Pakistan conflict, in Kolkata, India, on May 14. Debajyoti Chakraborty/Getty Images
Trump’s peace broker instincts could soon be put to the test again. Twin blasts in New Delhi and Islamabad in mid-November—both treated as terror attacks by the respective governments—raised hackles in both capitals. Both sides have been cautious in their attribution and investigations thus far, sparking hope that a broader conflagration can be avoided this time. But a still-simmering recent conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan, during which the Afghan foreign minister visited New Delhi, is a reminder of how much of a tinderbox the region remains.
Claiming credit aside, Trump’s interest in continued stability in the region is obvious. “What he will likely continue to do is really remind everybody—especially the Indians and the Pakistanis—that he does not want them getting into another conflict, mini or not,” said Younus. “That’s primarily because it’s a distraction for his administration, but more importantly it create[s] and insert[s] volatility into his plans for the Middle East.”
Beyond that, Trump’s transactional outlook and preference for bilateral negotiations mean he is far less inclined to link India and Pakistan or weigh one against the other than other presidents might have been. “President Trump does not view U.S. relations with India and with Pakistan as a zero-sum game or in a broader strategic context,” the former U.S. diplomat said. “He does not view good relations with one country as detrimental to good relations with the other.”
That’s exactly what Pakistan wants. “Don’t look at us through the Chinese, Indian, Russian, Afghan, Iranian lens,” Sheikh said. “We need our own lens. We need our own, stand-alone, on our own merit, relations with the United States, void of us being impacted by any other bilateral relationship that the United States may have, and vice versa.”
Sharif stands behind a lectern with a U.S. seal on it, gesturing with one hand, while Trump stands at left looking down at him.
Sharif speaks alongside Trump during the Gaza summit in Sharm El-Sheikh on Oct. 13. Suzanne Plunkett/AFP via Getty Images
The challenge for Pakistan now will be maintaining that relationship with an unpredictable U.S. president—whose proclivities it has navigated effectively thus far—while also ensuring the relationship can outlast him. Delivering on its critical minerals promises and playing a role in maintaining peace in the Middle East will be key to those efforts, according to Younus. Pakistan’s recent signing of a landmark security pact with Saudi Arabia will further enmesh it in the region’s fate.
Sheikh is aware that Pakistan must work to ensure its early-term Trump gains are sustainable. “Our relationship looks good, as good as it has ever been in terms of looks, but it looks good,” he said. “In our future interactions on the way forward, we have to make good on it.”
