The Supreme Court’s relist rolls served up the term’s first two summary reversals last week. As we have observed, the more times a case has been relisted, the likelier it is to be resolved by some kind of summary order. We saw that in five-time relist Pitts v. Mississippi, where the court unanimously reversed a Mississippi Supreme Court decision upholding the child-abuse conviction of Jeffery Pitts. The court held that a state statute authorizing a child witness to be shielded by a screen (so that the child cannot see the defendant) does not by itself satisfy the Sixth Amendment right of face-to-face confrontation: Before allowing such screening, the trial court must make a “case-specific” finding that screening is necessary to protect the child from trauma.
Balancing that pro-defense ruling, the court also issued a summary reversal in favor of state prosecutors in Clark v. Sweeney, which had twice been relisted. There, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit erred on habeas review by ordering that Jeremiah Sweeney be re-tried for murder based on a claim he never raised – thus substituting its own theory for the argument Sweeney had actually asserted. The court directed the 4th Circuit on remand to restrict itself to considering Sweeney’s own claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
But not all petitioners were so lucky. The court in Beck v. United States denied petitioner’s request to reconsider Feres v. United States, which held that the Federal Tort Claims Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not extend to injuries that “arise out of or are in the course of [one’s] military duty.” Justice Clarence Thomas, a leading critic of the Feres doctrine, dissented from the denial of review, emphasizing that the fatal crash at issue occurred while the servicemember was off-duty, so applying Feres made no sense. Justice Neil Gorsuch noted that he would grant the petition but did not join the opinion. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote an opinion respecting the denial of certiorari, agreeing with Thomas that “Feres … is a difficult decision to justify,” but stating that Congress and not the court should decide whether to overrule it under principles of stare decisis.
Now on to the new business. There are a remarkable 50 new relists on the docket – nearly 20% of the 255 cases on the docket for this Friday’s conference. Happily for my mental health, they raise only six issues.
Birthright citizenship
The most high-profile of this week’s relists are already well known to SCOTUSblog readers: Trump v. Washington and Trump v. Barbara. As Amy Howe reported, the court did not act last week “on the challenges to President Donald Trump’s Jan. 20 executive order seeking to end birthright citizenship,” teeing up their reconsideration at this Friday’s conference.
In Barbara v. Trump, a New Hampshire federal district judge issued a preliminary injunction that barred the Trump administration from enforcing the executive order denying U.S. citizenship to babies born to temporary visitors and undocumented aliens on or after Feb. 20, 2025. And in Trump v. Washington, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled that the executive order “is invalid because it contradicts the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment’s grant of citizenship to ‘all persons born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.’” In its petition for review, the Trump administration argues that the 14th Amendment’s citizenship clause does not confer citizenship “on the children of aliens temporarily visiting the United States or of illegal aliens.” The challengers counter that the Supreme Court already decided the issue in favor of their position more than a century ago in United States v. Wong Kim Ark. And regardless, they say, Congress has basically codified that interpretation in statutory law.
Felon-in-possession law
Section 922(g)(1) of Title 18 sets forth one of the most commonly prosecuted crimes in the U.S. Code, prohibiting anyone convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a firearm. Section 925(c) permits anyone affected by that prohibition to petition the attorney general for relief. But Congress has enacted appropriations riders every year since 1992 prohibiting the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (to which the attorney general delegated that authority) from spending money to process such requests – basically functioning as a prohibition of the restoration of firearm possession rights. In 2023, the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit held that Section 922(g)(1)’s lifetime prohibition violated the Second Amendment as applied to the defendant, determining that under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, the practice was unconstitutional because at the founding there was no established tradition of prohibiting gun ownership by those convicted of such nonviolent felonies.
The government petitioned the Supreme Court for review of that decision in Range v. Garland, stating that the decision “conflicts with recent decisions of [other courts of appeals] expressly rejecting felony-by-felony litigation about 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality.” After the Supreme Court decided in United States v. Rahimi that the Second Amendment permitted disarming people subject to a domestic violence restraining order, the government filed a supplemental brief urging the court to grant review in Range and on “multiple petitions involving different felonies” to “consider Section 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality across a range of circumstances.” The government specifically argued that “this Court should grant review in Range or Vincent [v. Garland],” a case decided against defendant Melynda Vincent by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit. But the court did not grant plenary review; instead, it vacated the judgments in both Range and Vincent and remanded for further consideration in light of Rahimi. On remand, the 10th Circuit reaffirmed its earlier decision.
Vincent is now back seeking review in Vincent v. Bondi, arguing the circuits are still divided, and contending that her 17-year-old conviction for trying to cash a fraudulent check for $498.12 shouldn’t disable her for life from protecting herself and her family with a firearm. Vincent presents a sympathetic figure because since her long-ago conviction, she’s lived as a law-abiding social worker, mother, nonprofit founder, and adjunct professor. The National Rifle Association and other gun-rights organizations have filed an amicus brief arguing that the historical tradition only supports disarming dangerous persons.
The government tells the court to hold its fire. It argues that the circuit split “may evaporate” because the DOJ has recently revived the Section 925(c) administrative relief process. “Recognizing that the appropriations bar applies only to ATF,” the attorney general recently withdrew the delegation and is now implementing the process in-house, having granted relief to several petitioners and with more in the pipeline. The government says “the availability of relief under Section 925(c) dooms the Second Amendment challenge raised in the petition for a writ of certiorari” because Section 922(g)(1) no longer presents a permanent disability. In reply, Vincent argues that the nascent Section 925(c) program affects neither the split nor the merits and urges review.
Vincent is joined by a small army of 43 other petitioners. For some early cases, the court ordered the government to file responses. Then for a bunch of later petitions, the government filed short-form memoranda in opposition without even being asked. For the most recent cluster of petitions, the government waived its right to respond and the court didn’t ask it to file anything. The court is likely considering whether it needs to take this up now or instead can wait and see if the Section 925(c) process actually affords relief.
Schools, parents, and pronouns
Our next relist will also be familiar to faithful SCOTUSblog readers: Foote v. Ludlow School Committee. If you’re tracking the burgeoning docket of parental-rights petitions landing at the Supreme Court, you’re already familiar with the fact that several justices have expressed concern about “whether a school district violates parents’ fundamental rights ‘when, without parental knowledge or consent, it encourages a student to transition to a new gender or assists in that process.’” Petitioners Stephen Foote and Marissa Silvestri argue that their Massachusetts middle school violated their parental rights under the Constitution to raise their child as they see fit when it allegedly implemented a protocol instructing staff to use a student’s preferred name and pronouns at school without notifying their parents. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit affirmed dismissal, reasoning that schools have broad authority over “curricular and administrative” matters, that parental rights diminish inside the schoolhouse gate, and that the school didn’t “coerce” the child. Foote and Silvestri contend that the circuit court blew past a century of precedent protecting parental control over upbringing, education, and medical decisions, and deepened multiple circuit splits about the scope of those rights. They are supported by a host of amici, including a group of 21 states and the territory of Guam that argue the 1st Circuit bungled the law. The school committee’s brief in opposition urges a hard pass, arguing there’s no actual “protocol,” no actual circuit split, and no clean vehicle – just conclusory allegations that crumble on inspection.
Criminal venue and limitations
This week brings an interesting criminal venue and limitations case wrapped inside a colorful fact pattern: Petitioner Ahmad Abouammo, a former Twitter employee, was convicted in the Northern District of California for presenting the FBI agents then interviewing him in Seattle with a false document about whether he leaked Saudi dissidents’ private Twitter account information to an associate of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit held that venue was proper in San Francisco because the federal obstruction statute permits charging anywhere a falsity has a “contemplated effect.” In Abouammo v. United States, petitioner argues that this “effects-based venue” theory defies the Constitution’s demand that crimes be tried where they are “committed,” widens a circuit split, and green-lights forum shopping (i.e., encourages the government to find a venue favorable to it). Amici – from Cato to the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers – warn that the ruling below effectively turns any district with an FBI office into a universal venue, contradicting centuries of territorial limits.
As a bonus issue, Abouammo argues that the government also blew past the statute of limitations by charging him on the last day of the limitations period by criminal information, without obtaining a waiver from him of his right to be charged by indictment – and then months later dismissing that information and filing an indictment setting forth identical charges. The government relied on 18 U.S.C. § 3288, which allows it to re-file “an indictment or information charging a felony” within six months after a dismissal “for any reason” (provided the dismissal was not based on a time bar). The 9th Circuit blessed that workaround, but the petition calls it unconstitutional gamesmanship: under the Fifth Amendment, a felony can’t be “charged” by information without the defendant’s waiver, making the placeholder information a legal nullity incapable of extending the deadline, according to Abouammo. Amici urge the court to intervene before prosecutors routinely use defective informations to resurrect time-barred charges. For its part, the government argues that there’s no circuit split and that use of the Section 3288 workaround is unlikely to recur outside of emergencies like the 2020 COVID lockdown that prompted it in this case.
Arbitration and the “jurisdictional anchor”
Arbitration wonks, this one’s for you. Under Sections 9 and 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, a party may apply to confirm or vacate an arbitration award. But federal courts have limited jurisdiction over Section 9 and 10 applications. In the 2022 case of Badgerow v. Walters, the Supreme Court held that a federal court may exercise jurisdiction only if the application establishes diversity or federal-question jurisdiction on its face. A federal court may not exercise jurisdiction merely on the basis that the underlying dispute could have been brought there.
Petitioner Adrian Jules was fired from his job as a security guard at L.A.’s Chateau Marmont, then brought suit for alleged discrimination in New York against the Chateau’s partial owners, Andre Balazs Properties (and related persons and entities) – allegedly to avoid Jules’ arbitration agreement with the Chateau. The district court stayed that action while the dispute was arbitrated. After losing his employment claims in arbitration – complete with sanctions for what the arbitrator called “beyond unusual” litigation misconduct – Balazs and the other respondents returned to federal court to seek to enforce the award, and Jules cross-filed to vacate it. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, relying on circuit precedent, held in an unpublished order that because Jules had originally filed a discrimination suit under federal law, the court retained a “jurisdictional anchor” to confirm the award even though the post-arbitration motions themselves presented no independent basis for federal jurisdiction. Jules says that ruling deepened a post-Badgerow split: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit has rejected the jurisdictional-anchor doctrine, insisting courts must have an independent jurisdictional basis at the post-award stage, while the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd and 7th Circuits have held the opposite.
In Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties, Jules argues the 2nd Circuit has effectively created a Badgerow-proof workaround, letting parties file any claim in federal court, obtain a stay, and then guarantee federal review of an otherwise unreviewable state-law arbitration dispute – a recipe for forum-shopping. Balazs and the other respondents downplay the split as “weak, shallow, and unreasoned,” urging the court to let things percolate and painting this case as a “poor vehicle,” bogged down with unusual facts and petitioner-created “procedural irregularities.” Jules’ reply insists the split is real, entrenched, and ripe for resolution, asserting that both sides agree the issue is recurring and important enough to eventually warrant review.
We’ve now reached the point in the development in the law that the Supreme Court’s arbitration petitions involve as arcane and reticulated factual situations as their AEDPA petitions do.
Rooker-Feldman returns
For people who, like me, sat in the last row of Federal Courts class, Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prevents parties who lose in state courts from challenging injuries caused by state-court judgments.” In T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp., the court is asked to decide whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal suits challenging state-court decisions that remain subject to further state-court review.
Petitioner T.M., a woman with a rare gluten-sensitivity condition that can trigger psychosis, was involuntarily committed to the Baltimore Washington Medical Center, where she claims staff ignored her advance medical directive and sought to forcibly medicate her in ways contrary to that directive. After multiple state filings, she entered a consent order for her release under conditions like monitored medication; she appealed it in state court (where the action has been stayed). Petitioner also sued in federal court alleging duress and constitutional violations and seeking an injunction
The district court dismissed her suit under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, reasoning that T.M. was seeking federal review of a state-court order that she was claiming had injured her. The 4th Circuit affirmed for basically the same reasons, and rejected T.M.’s contention that Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable where further review of the state-court judgment is still available.
In T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp., T.M. argues that under Exxon Mobil Corp v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., Rooker-Feldman is “confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name,” and in both of those cases, “the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended.” T.M. claims that there is a “deep and acknowledged” split among the courts, that the decision below errs by expanding a narrow exception to federal jurisdiction, and that this issue recurs often for pro se litigants. The University of Maryland Medical System counters that there is no split here – the other cases involve different facts unlike the “extreme outlier fact pattern” here that has “yet to be confronted in any other circuit”; the question does not warrant review; and the ruling is correct, as T.M. seeks appellate review in district court.
That’s all for this week. I love a good relist as much as the next guy – more even. But let’s hope that in the weeks to come, we get slightly fewer.
New Relists
Vincent v. Bondi, 24-1155
Issue: Whether the Second Amendment allows the federal government to permanently disarm Petitioner, who has one 17-year-old nonviolent felony conviction for trying to pass a bad check.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Mayfield v. United States, 24-7400
Issue: Whether Mr. Mayfield’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024).
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Medrano v. United States, 24-7508
Issues: (1) Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment as applied to a defendant whose most serious prior felony convictions are attempted burglary and vehicle theft; (2) whether an appellate court should take at face value the assertion of sentencing judges that they would have selected the exact same sentence regardless of any error in applying the Sentencing Guidelines.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Foote v. Ludlow School Committee, 25-77
Issue: Whether a public school violates parents’ constitutional rights when, without parental knowledge or consent, the school encourages a student to transition to a new “gender” or participates in that process.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties, 25-83
Issue: Whether a federal court that initially exercises jurisdiction and stays a case pending arbitration maintains jurisdiction over a post-arbitration Section 9 or 10 application where jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp., 25-197
Issue: Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents parties who lose in state courts from challenging injuries caused by state-court judgments, can be triggered by a state-court decision that remains subject to further review in state court.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Trump v. Washington, 25-364
Issue: Whether Executive Order No. 14,160 complies on its face with the citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment and with 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), which codifies that clause.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Trump v. Barbara, 25-365
Issue: Whether Executive Order No. 14,160 complies on its face with the citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment and with 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), which codifies that clause.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Duarte v. United States, 25-425
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1)’s categorical ban on the possession of firearms by felons is unconstitutional as applied to a defendant with non-violent predicate offenses underlying his conviction.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Willis v. United States, 25-5009
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both facially and as applied to Mr. Willis, in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) .
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Abouammo v. United States, 25-5146
Issues: (1) Whether venue is proper in a district where no offense conduct took place, so long as the statute’s intent element “contemplates” effects that could occur there; (2) whether a criminal information unaccompanied by a waiver of indictment is an “information charging a felony” that allows the government to unilaterally extend the statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3288.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Howard v. United States, 25-5220
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment as applied to a defendant whose most serious prior felony conviction is drug trafficking.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Marshall v. United States, 25-5259
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which permanently prohibits possession of a firearm by a person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, is subject to as-applied challenges under the Second Amendment.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Reese v. United States, 25-5327
Issues: (1) Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms or ammunition, violates the Second Amendment either on its face or as applied to the petitioner, who has no violent felony conviction; (2) whether § 922(g)(1), which purports to make a felon’s intrastate possession of firearms and ammunition a federal crime solely because those items crossed state lines at some point, exceeds Congress’ commerce clause authority.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Compton v. United States, 25-5358
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of any felony offense violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Osbourne v. United States, 25-5382
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of any felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Cantu v. United States, 25-5388
Issue: Whether, as the Eighth Circuit held, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (which prohibits any felon from possessing firearms) is invariably constitutional both facially and as applied to any defendant, no matter the case-specific circumstances.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Williams v. United States, 25-5415
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied when the predicate convictions which make the person ineligible to possess a firearm were pursuant to a statute which had been found facially unconstitutional for violating the Second Amendment.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Mitchell v. United States, 25-5417
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Hernandez v. United States, 25-5421
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute that prohibits anyone who has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Amendment either facially or as applied to individuals with prior convictions for non-violent offenses.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Kearney v. United States, 25-5424
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Terry v. United States, 25-5433
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Thompson v. United States, 25-5434
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Fowler v. United States, 25-5437
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Finney v. United States, 25-5438
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Greene v. United States, 25-5439
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Perry v. United States, 25-5441
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Crews v. United States, 25-5443
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Gilbert v. United States, 25-5607
Issues: (1) Whether defendants may assert as-applied challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment; (2) whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession by felons violates the Second Amendment as applied to Mr. Gilbert, who was previously convicted of a non-violent theft offense.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Coleman v. United States, 25-5614
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Brown v. United States, 25-5624
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Chafin v. United States, 25-5626
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of any felony offense violates the Second Amendment as applied to Mr. Chafin.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Coles v. United States, 25-5627
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Allen v. United States, 25-5655
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Sternquist v. United States, 25-5656
Issues: (1)Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to Ms. Sternquist because, consistent with the Second Amendment, the federal government may not permanently disarm citizens like her, who have only remote-in-time, nonviolent prior felony convictions; (2) whether ATF’s definition of “silencer” as including tubes that do not have holes drilled in them is contrary to the statutory definition of “silencer,” and whether, following Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024), it is error for the courts to defer entirely to ATF’s definition without conducting their own analysis.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Royal v. United States, 25-5658
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Town v. United States, 25-5667
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Coleman v. United States, 25-5668
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession for all individuals previously convicted of a felony violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Shoffner v. United States, 25-5678
Issue: Whether the district court erred in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss the indictment on the Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Robinson v. United States, 25-5707
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which permanently prohibits possession of a firearm by a person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, is subject to as-applied challenges under the Second Amendment.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Ketzner v. United States, 25-5708
Issue: Whether the Second Amendment allows the federal government to permanently disarm Petitioner Jason Ketzner, due to prior felony convictions, regardless of the nature of those convictions and without any individualized judicial determination of his dangerousness.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Brown v. United States, 25-5731
Issues: (1) Whether defendants may assert as-applied challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment; (2) whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession by felons violates the Second Amendment as applied to Mr. Brown, who was previously convicted of non-violent felony drug possession and gun possession offenses.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Kimble v. United States, 25-5747
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute that prohibits anyone who has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Amendment either facially or as applied to individuals with convictions for non-violent offenses.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Lee v. United States, 25-5748
Issue: Whether Mr. Lee’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi.
Staley v. United States, 25-5850
Issues: (1) Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the statute permanently prohibiting possession of firearms by persons convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, is subject to as-applied challenges under the Second Amendment; (2) whether § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to Mr. Staley, whose prior felonies were themselves nonviolent gun-possession offenses.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Peck v. United States, 25-5858
Issues: (1) Whether 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(l) violates the Second Amendment as applied to Petitioner, who was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm based on a Nebraska conviction for marijuana possession; (2) whether the Leon good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule applies when law enforcement has not taken reasonable steps to educate itself on the law of the Fourth Amendment.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Hemphill v. United States, 25-5875
Issue: Whether the Fifth Circuit correctly applied the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), in deciding that the Second Amendment did not apply to Mr. Hemphill’s possession of a firearm.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Robinson v. United States, 25-5903
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Contreras v. United States, 25-5909
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute that prohibits anyone who has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Amendment either facially or as applied to individuals with prior convictions for offenses that did not result in disarmament in the Founding era.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Espinal v. United States, 25-5916
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to Petitioner because, consistent with the Second Amendment, the federal government may not permanently bar a citizen from possessing a firearm and ammunition based exclusively on a prior felony conviction.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21 conference.)
Returning Relists
Does 1-2 v. Hochul, 24-1015
Issues: (1) Whether compliance with state laws directly contrary to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s requirement to provide a reasonable accommodation for religious beliefs may serve as an undue hardship justifying an employer’s noncompliance with Title VII; and (2) whether a state law that requires employers to deny without any consideration all requests by employees for a religious accommodation, contrary to Title VII’s religious nondiscrimination provision, is preempted by Title VII and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
(Relisted after the Sept. 29, Oct. 10, Oct. 17, Nov. 7, Nov. 14 and Nov. 21 conferences.)
Smith v. Scott, 24-1099
Issues: (1) Whether, viewing the facts from the officers’ perspective at the time, the officers acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment by using bodyweight pressure to restrain a potentially armed and actively resisting individual only until handcuffing could be accomplished; and (2) whether the panel erred in denying qualified immunity where no case clearly established that pre-handcuffing bodyweight pressure violates the Fourth Amendment.
(Relisted after the Sept. 29, Oct. 10, Oct. 17, Nov. 7, Nov. 14 and Nov. 21 conferences.)
Pitchford v. Cain, 24-7351
Issues: (1) Whether clearly established federal law requires reversal of a state appellate court’s denial of relief from a capital prosecutor’s discriminatory exercise of four peremptory strikes against Black venire members wherein the trial court, for each of the four strikes, failed to determine “the plausibility of the reason in light of all evidence with a bearing on it” under Miller-El v. Dretke; (2) whether Mississippi Supreme Court precedent, which deems waived on direct review arguments of pretext not stated in the trial record, defies this court’s clearly established federal law under Batson v. Kentucky; and (3) whether a finding of waiver on a trial record possessing Batson objections, defense counsel’s efforts to argue the objection, and the trial court’s express assurance the issues were preserved constitutes an unreasonable determination of facts.
(Relisted after the Sept. 29, Oct. 10, Oct. 17, Nov. 7, Nov. 14 and Nov. 21 conferences.)
Klein v. Martin, 25-51
Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit violated the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act‘s deferential standard by overturning a state-court decision based on the supposed lack of “nuance” and “exhaustiveness” in the court’s written opinion, rather than the reasonableness of its legal conclusion.
(Relisted after the Sept. 29, Oct. 10, Oct. 17, Nov. 7, Nov. 14 and Nov. 21 conferences.)
Indiana, ex rel. Howell v. Circuit Court of Indiana, Wells County, 25-5557
Issues: (1)Whether petitioner made a sufficient factual showing to establish “good cause” for discovering actual judicial bias by showing that the trial judge had made specific allegations as to how his case was affected; (2) whether the Indiana Supreme Court erred in holding that every Indiana Post-Conviction Remedies Rule 1, Section 12 motion constitutes a prohibited “second or successive” petitione as a matter of law; (3) whether a prosecutor’s failure to correct testimony of a witness that he knew to be false was used to obtain a conviction, even though other testimony regarding the witness’s credibility was introduced.
(Relisted after the Nov. 7, Nov. 14 and Nov. 21 conferences.)
Hoffman v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc., 25-159
Issue: Whether in private condemnations under the Natural Gas Act, just compensation should be determined by reference to state law.
(Relisted after the Nov. 14 and Nov 21 conferences.)
Doe v. Dynamic Physical Therapy, LLC, 25-180
Issue: Whether a state procedural law that immunizes a healthcare provider from liability during a public health emergency may override a federal substantive claim based on the Americans with Disability Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, effectively denying the corresponding remedy authorized by these federal statutes by forcing plaintiffs to meet a heightened standard to prove federal claims than provided for in the federal statutes.
(Relisted after the Nov. 14 and Nov 21 conferences.)
Crowther v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 25-183
Issue: Whether Title IX provides employees of federally funded educational institutions a private right of action to sue for sex discrimination in employment.
(Relisted after the Nov. 14 and Nov. 21 conferences.)
Allen v. Guzman, 25-5879
Issues: Whether petitioner has a state-created liberty in the appointment of counsel under the newly enacted California Racial Justice Act Penal Gode Section 1473(e), which provides that “the court shall appoint counsel, if the petitioner cannot afford counsel.”
(Relisted after the Nov. 14 and Nov. 21 conferences.)
Posted in Featured, Relist Watch
Cases: Does 1-2 v. Hochul, Smith v. Scott, Vincent v. Bondi, Pitchford v. Cain, Hoffmann v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc., Doe v. Dynamic Physical Therapy, LLC, Crowther v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, T. M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp., Trump v. Washington, Trump v. Barbara, Duarte v. United States, Klein v. Martin, Abouammo v. United States, Foote v. Ludlow School Committee, Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties
Recommended Citation:
John Elwood,
Relistpalooza: fifty new relists, six big fights,
SCOTUSblog (Dec. 3, 2025, 5:18 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/12/relistpalooza-fifty-new-relists-six-big-fights/
