Europeans lulled themselves into the belief that U.S. President Donald Trump is unpredictable and inconsistent but ultimately manageable. This is strangely reassuring, but wrong. From U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech denigrating Europe at the Munich Security Conference in February to the new U.S. National Security Strategy that was released on Dec. 4, the Trump administration has long had a clear and consistent vision for Europe: one that prioritizes U.S.-Russia ties and seeks to divide and conquer the continent, with much of the dirty work carried out by nationalist, far-right European forces that now enjoy backing from both Moscow and Washington. It is long past time for Europe to realize that, when it comes to the Russia-Ukraine war and the continent’s security, it is, at best, alone. At worst, it now faces two adversaries: Russia in the east and Trump’s United States in the west.
Every time Trump or members of his administration have lashed out at Europe, including Ukraine, Europeans have absorbed the blow with a forced smile and bent over backwards to flatter the White House. They believe this is a clever ploy, playing on Trump’s perceived incoherence and vanity to bring him back into the transatlantic fold. Yet each time Trump has turned his narrow attention to the Ukraine war, he has sided with Russia—from the Oval Office trap set for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in February, to the red carpet laid out for Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska in August, to the 28-point “peace plan” that was likely written in Moscow. On every occasion, Europeans have taken the hit, busying themselves with keeping Washington engaged and salvaging what remains of the transatlantic bond. Europeans have turned so many cheeks to Trump that one wonders if they have any left at all.
Europeans lulled themselves into the belief that U.S. President Donald Trump is unpredictable and inconsistent but ultimately manageable. This is strangely reassuring, but wrong. From U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech denigrating Europe at the Munich Security Conference in February to the new U.S. National Security Strategy that was released on Dec. 4, the Trump administration has long had a clear and consistent vision for Europe: one that prioritizes U.S.-Russia ties and seeks to divide and conquer the continent, with much of the dirty work carried out by nationalist, far-right European forces that now enjoy backing from both Moscow and Washington. It is long past time for Europe to realize that, when it comes to the Russia-Ukraine war and the continent’s security, it is, at best, alone. At worst, it now faces two adversaries: Russia in the east and Trump’s United States in the west.
Every time Trump or members of his administration have lashed out at Europe, including Ukraine, Europeans have absorbed the blow with a forced smile and bent over backwards to flatter the White House. They believe this is a clever ploy, playing on Trump’s perceived incoherence and vanity to bring him back into the transatlantic fold. Yet each time Trump has turned his narrow attention to the Ukraine war, he has sided with Russia—from the Oval Office trap set for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in February, to the red carpet laid out for Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska in August, to the 28-point “peace plan” that was likely written in Moscow. On every occasion, Europeans have taken the hit, busying themselves with keeping Washington engaged and salvaging what remains of the transatlantic bond. Europeans have turned so many cheeks to Trump that one wonders if they have any left at all.
But Europe has placed a losing bet on an endless Groundhog Day. When it comes to Europe, Ukraine, and Russia, the Trump administration has been remarkably coherent. Trump wants the Ukraine war to end, mainly because he sees it as an irritant preventing the normalization of U.S.-Russia ties—especially the planned business deals between his entourage and the Kremlin’s cronies. This fits into a worldview of imperial collusion. The liberal world order is out; in its place comes survival of the fittest. Rather than old-fashioned superpower competition, Trump is keen to pursue imperial collusion with both Russia and China. The rest of the world, including Europe, is on the colonial menu.
Strategically, this has a certain short-term logic. Ideologically, it aligns with support for far-right parties and governments in Europe and beyond. Not only do these forces share the nationalist and socially conservative views championed by MAGA, they are also working to divide Europe and hollow out the European integration project, with center-right forces playing the useful idiots by collaborating with them. There is nothing less patriotic than the supposed patriots and sovereigntists in Europe who go about eviscerating European unity while pursuing collusion with Russia. The vision laid out in the new U.S. National Security Strategy is scant on concrete policies regarding Europe, but the document’s message is clear: The only conceivable transatlantic bond is that between far-right forces, where alpha Americans dominate their European minions. It is an exact parallel of the vision and strategy that Putin’s Russia has pursued toward Europe for years.
If Trump has not yet subjugated Europe to his wishes, it is not because of clever European shenanigans. Flattering Trump by calling him “daddy,” showering him with presents, and inviting him to royal dinners will save neither Ukraine nor the transatlantic relationship. Nor will frantic European diplomacy, collective treks to Washington, or alternative peace plans do the trick. If Trump has not yet realized his vision for the Ukraine war and a new balance of power in Europe, it is simply because Putin is still playing hard to get. But counting on Putin always undermining a U.S.-Russia agreement cannot be Europe’s security strategy.
What should Europeans do instead?
The good news is there is a critical mass of European publics and governments that understand European security runs through Kyiv. This includes those of Germany, France, Britain, Poland, the Nordic countries, the Baltic states, the Netherlands, Spain, and, at a stretch, Italy—if only because the Italians are loath to be left out. They recognize that Russia’s war of imperial conquest begins with Ukraine but does not end with it and that Kyiv’s capitulation would only free up Russian resources to open new fronts against Europe. Ukraine is, tragically, the gate that prevents the hybrid war already raging in Europe from turning into a much more serious military attack.
The second piece of good news is that Europe has levers—perhaps more than the United States—when it comes to the war in Ukraine. Since Trump took office, U.S. support for Ukraine has ground to a halt. It is Europe that holds most of Russia’s frozen assets, imposes the sanctions that truly bite, supports Ukraine economically, and provides the bulk of military aid. In part due to European investments in Ukraine, a growing share of the country’s defense now rests on its own domestic industry.
This is not to paint an unduly rosy picture. The United States remains absolutely critical to Ukraine and Europe, especially for the intelligence it provides that enables Ukraine to intercept Russian drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure as well as identify targets for deep strikes into Russia. Beyond this, the United States profits by selling weapons that Europeans buy for Ukraine—weapons that Europe does not produce at scale or at all.
This points to a wider conundrum affecting Ukrainian and European security. Europe is working to reduce its vulnerabilities by ramping up defense spending, but often this entails buying more U.S. weapons. It is reducing its short-term vulnerabilities at the cost of increasing its long-term dependence on a United States that now weaponizes its nominal allies’ dependence. Europeans are far from resolving this dilemma.
While a systemic answer to Europe’s security conundrum is not in sight, Europeans do have the levers to prevent Ukraine’s capitulation and create the conditions for a just peace. What is missing—and what must be addressed—are two ingredients.
First is Europe’s ability to focus on its strategic purpose. European leaders and institutions have an abstract understanding of long-term strategy, but in practice, they are often caught up in short-term, particularistic interests. Nowhere is this clearer than in Belgium’s and the European Central Bank’s myopic stances on the use of Russia’s frozen assets to help Ukraine. While there are undoubtedly financial and legal risks involved, these pale in comparison to the political, economic, and security costs for Europe that could follow if Ukraine falls.
The second ingredient is courage. European leaders should muster the courage to go to Washington, politely thank Trump for his “peace” efforts, and persuade him that the world is rife with other conflicts needing his attention. Europeans can say: When it comes to Ukraine, we can handle the war. All we ask is to keep the intelligence flowing and continue greenlighting weapons purchases while we buy time to build our own.
Europe cannot promise to end the war today, but it can commit to building the conditions for sustainable security in the continent. And if flattery is necessary, Europe can even reassure Trump that when the day of peace comes, it will gladly dedicate a monument, a square, or a shiny, golden prize to him.
