The first USSR nuclear test Joe 1 at Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, 29 August 1949. Credit: CTBTO
SAN FRANCISCO, USA, December 2 (IPS) – In a Truth Social post that reverberated around the world, on October 29 President Donald Trump wrote: “Because of other countries’ testing programs, I have instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis.”
A month later, it remains unclear what “testing programs” Trump had in mind. Other than North Korea, which last tested in 2017, no country has carried out nuclear-explosive testing since 1998.
Some commentators speculated that Trump was referring to tests of nuclear weapons delivery systems, since Russia had just carried out tests of innovative systems, a long-range torpedo and a nuclear-powered cruise missile.
Perhaps to underline that the United States too tests delivery systems, in an unusual November 13 press release Sandia National Laboratories announced an August test in which an F-35 aircraft dropped inert nuclear bombs.
It appears, though, that the testing in question concerns nuclear warheads. In what was clearly an effort to contain the implications of Trump’s announcement, on November 2, Energy Secretary Chris Wright said regarding US plans that “I think the tests we’re talking about right now” involve “noncritical” rather than “nuclear” explosions. The Energy Department is responsible for development and maintenance of the nuclear arsenal.
In contrast, Trump’s remarks in an interview taped on October 31 point toward alleged underground nuclear-explosive testing by Russia, China, and other countries as the basis for parallel US testing. His remarks perhaps were sparked by years-old US intelligence assessments that Russia and China may have conducted extremely low-yield experiments that cannot be detected remotely.
The prudent approach is to assume that Trump is talking about a US return to nuclear-explosive testing. That assumption is reinforced by the fact that a few days after Trump’s social media post, the United States was the sole country to vote against a UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
The Russian government is taking this approach. On November 5, President Vladimir Putin ordered relevant agencies to study the possible start of preparations for explosive testing of nuclear warheads.
US resumption of nuclear-explosive testing would be a disastrous policy. It would elevate the role of nuclear arms in international affairs, making nuclear conflict more likely. Indeed, nuclear tests can function as a kind of threat.
It likely would also stimulate and facilitate nuclear arms racing already underway among the United States, Russia, and China. Over the longer term nuclear-explosive testing would encourage additional countries to acquire nuclear weapons, as they come to terms with deeper reliance on nuclear arms by the major powers.
Resumption of nuclear test explosions would also be contrary to US international obligations. The United States and China have signed but not ratified the CTBT. Russia is in the same position, having withdrawn its ratification in 2023 to maintain parity with the United States. Due to the lack of necessary ratifications, the CTBT has not entered into force. Since the CTBT was negotiated in 1996, the three countries have observed a moratorium on nuclear-explosive testing.
That posture is consistent with the international law obligation, set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, of a signatory state to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.
The object and purpose of the CTBT is perfectly clear: to prevent and prohibit the carrying out of a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.
The CTBT is a major multilateral agreement with an active implementing organization that operates a multi-faceted world-wide system to verify the testing prohibition. It stands as a precedent for a future global agreement or agreements that would control fissile materials used to make nuclear weapons, control missiles and other delivery systems, and reduce and eliminate nuclear arsenals.
The sidelining or evisceration of the CTBT due to an outbreak of nuclear-explosive testing would reverse decades of progress towards establishing a nuclear-weapons-free world.
A return to nuclear-explosive testing would similarly be incompatible with compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Its Article VI requires the negotiation of “cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date.”
Nuclear-explosive testing has long been understood as a driver of nuclear arms racing. The preamble to the NPT recalls the determination expressed in the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits above-ground nuclear tests, “to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end.”
In 1995, as part of a package enabling the NPT’s indefinite extension, a review conference committed to completion of negotiations on the CTBT by 1996, which was accomplished. In 2000 and 2010, review conferences called for bringing the CTBT into force.
To resume nuclear-explosive testing though a comprehensive ban has been negotiated, and to support design and development of nuclear weapons through such testing, would be a thoroughgoing repudiation of a key aim of the NPT, the cessation of the nuclear arms race.
That would erode the legitimacy of the NPT, which since 1970 has served as an important barrier to the spread of nuclear arms. The next review conference will be held in the spring of 2026. Resumption of nuclear-explosive testing, or intensified preparations to do so, would severely undermine any prospect of an agreed outcome.
It is imperative that the United States not resume explosive testing of nuclear weapons. It would be a very hard blow to the web of agreements and norms that limit nuclear arms and lay the groundwork for their elimination, and it could even lead toward the truly catastrophic consequences of a nuclear conflict.
IPS UN Bureau
© Inter Press Service (20251202094135) — All Rights Reserved. Original source: Inter Press Service
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Resumption of Nuclear-Explosive Testing: A Dangerous Path, Inter Press Service, Tuesday, December 02, 2025 (posted by Global Issues)
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Resumption of Nuclear-Explosive Testing: A Dangerous Path, Inter Press Service, Tuesday, December 02, 2025 (posted by Global Issues)
