By Mary Newman
November 21, 2025
The irrefutable influence that digital platforms have over commerce, communications, and the flow of information is one of the most pressing policy challenges of our time. While markets like the European Union are taking action with competition policy measures such as the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the United States remains behind on adopting similar regulations. Jurisdictions such as South Korea and Brazil are well past the starting line in this regulatory race with many adopting legal frameworks inspired by the DMA.
In today’s digital world, a handful of tech giants control much of what we see, buy, and say online. Companies such as Google, Amazon, Apple, and Meta dominate their markets so thoroughly that competition has become almost impossible. While this dominance can bring convenience for consumers, it also carries risk. When one platform becomes so dominant that it is the only realistic option, consumers lose meaningful alternatives, eliminating the power of choice. Furthermore, monopoly power limits innovation and quality. A lack of serious competition provides little incentive for companies to improve user experience or address harmful business practices.
In contrast with the EU, the U.S. continues to rely on enforcement through the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. These laws, while foundational, were written for the industrial era, not the digital one. As a result, consumers experience harms from platform concentration long after these platforms have been entrenched. The U.S. has addressed many of these harms through multiyear litigation (and, as the recent loss in the Meta case shows, the government may invest years and millions of dollars only to walk away with nothing gained). But to remain a leader in the evolving global tech market, the U.S. needs to adopt similar future-forward digital competition policies promoting fairness, innovation, and accountability.
The European Union’s Digital Market Act’s Influence
The DMA takes a proactive approach to regulating the digital economy. Rather than relying on slow, case-by-case enforcement, it sets clear ex ante (before harm occurs) rules for large “gatekeeper” platforms to ensure fair competition. These rules ban practices like self-preferencing (favoring own products or services), tying (conditioning access to one product or service on the mandatory use of another), and leveraging dominance across markets. They also require interoperability, data portability, and greater transparency.
The DMA’s logic is rooted in the idea that markets function best when the most powerful actors are subject to proactive obligations that allow competition to flourish. This rules-based model has begun to influence digital governance worldwide in what scholars refer to as the “Brussels Effect.” Policymakers beyond Europe are adopting similar updates to address digital competition.
Global Advancements: Case Studies on DMA’s Influence
DMA Concepts in South Korea
South Korea lacks an independent law that mirrors the DMA’s provisions, but similar reforms are underway. The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) is under the umbrella of the country’s primary competition/antitrust statute and regulates platforms under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA).
In December 2023, the KFTC proposed the Platform Competition Promotion Act (PCPA), modelled in part on the DMA, to designate “dominant platform operators” and impose ex-ante obligations on self-preferencing, multi-homing restrictions, most-favoured-nation (MFN) clauses, etc. Facing political and trade pushback from the U.S., the PCPA was withdrawn; but more modest amendments to the MRFTA are still being pursued.
There are distinctions in South Korea’s approach. While the DMA independently sets high turnover/market-cap thresholds and imposes broad ex-ante obligations, South Korea’s approach adopts similar logic through their existing law. The details (thresholds and designation) remain in flux. Additionally, South Korea’s market conditions are somewhat different (smaller domestic market, strong local tech players, high competition in many segments) which further shape the development of these rules.
DMA Concepts in Brazil
Brazil is also moving toward a DMA style framework, actively building a “Brazilian DMA” which is aimed at addressing competition and fairness issues in its digital markets.
Brazil’s current system is Law No. 12.529/2011, the country’s main competition law, which empowers the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) to investigate anti-competitive conduct, mergers, and abuses of dominance – but, unlike the DMA, only after harm occurs (ex post). Brazil’s Bill No. 2,768/2022 (see also), introduced in November 2022, closely resembles the structure and intentions of the DMA. It covers “essential access control power holders” and sets a relatively low designation threshold of at least BRL 70 million. Designated firms would face obligations on transparency, non-discrimination, and access. Likewise, the Ministry of Finance and CADE launched a consultation to define “systemically relevant digital platforms,” the results of which were later incorporated into Brazil’s 2025 “Fair Competition in Digital Markets” bill. This bill targets the same conduct DMA seeks to prevent: tying of services, discrimination, or abuse of dominance.
Brazil shares the DMA’s preventive philosophy but differs in structure, with lower thresholds and shared enforcement between the Agência Nacional de Telecomunicações (National Telecommunications Agency) and CADE. Fines could reach 20 percent of turnover (double the DMA’s cap). Although not yet enacted, Brazil’s reforms show clear momentum toward preventive digital regulation; clear evidence of the Brussels Effect spreading to Latin America.
Attempted Implementations in the United States
The U.S. risks becoming a policy laggard in a domain it once dominated. While Brazil and South Korea are taking steps toward constructing DMA-inspired hybrid frameworks with ex ante elements or making targeted reforms, the U.S. has not made such advancements. The Trump administration has condemned the EU’s DMA as discriminatory toward U.S. tech companies, framing it as an attack on American innovation and free speech. In response, it has threatened retaliatory measures, including tariffs and sanctions, while the EU insists the law applies equally to all firms and reflects its sovereign right to regulate digital markets. Meanwhile, it’s not just the EU, South Korea, or Brazil – more countries are moving ahead with proactive, flexible regulatory frameworks that address digital dominance before it distorts the market.
The U.S. currently relies on enforcement of existing antitrust laws through court rulings. The U.S. has piecemeal legislative proposals, but momentum for passage and implementation has slowed. High-profile cases like United States v. Google (2020) and FTC v. Meta demonstrate both the power and the limitations of this model. But litigation takes years; by the time enforcement concludes, markets have shifted, competitors have vanished, and consumers have little recourse. Legislative efforts to modernize antitrust policy, such as the Open App Markets Act (opening up the app markets), and the American Innovation and Choice Online Act (prohibiting platform self-preferencing and discrimination), can be the proactive approach to platform regulation that consumers need. Currently, neither of these acts have been considered past introductions.
Adopting new competition legislation which accounts for evolving tech would not only bring U.S. policy in line with global developments but also create a more balanced, forward-looking framework. For the government, proactive regulation offers predictability and efficiency. Clear rules prohibiting harmful behaviors (self-preferencing, tying, leveraging dominance across markets, etc.) could reduce the need for protracted litigation and make enforcement more consistent. For companies, ex ante obligations could foster compliance and level the playing field for responsible groups, preventing unfair practices by everyone. Entrepreneurs could benefit from fairer access to digital marketplaces, stimulating innovation and entry into spaces previously dominated by a few tech giants.
Ultimately, consumers stand to gain the most. Reduced gatekeeping and increased platform accountability could mean better choice, prices, and transparency. Instead of stifling innovation, proactive regulation can restore dynamic competition and rebuild public trust in digital markets. Thus, we can ensure that growth in tech innovation matches public interests and long-term economic stability.
Costs to the United States: Why We Need to Adopt Proactive Policies
In the absence of the U.S.’s own competition regulation, U.S.-based consumers will be left adapting to rules made elsewhere. To that end, the U.S. must pass digital platform competition legislation now. For consumers, platform governance rules like data portability, interoperability, and low switching costs would create genuine market choice.
The U.S., for the sake of the public interest, cannot afford to remain a bystander while other regions define the next generation of digital governance. A U.S. path toward competition regulation need not be abrupt. Congress could revive and refine stalled legislative proposals such as the Open App Markets Act, embedding them within a broader national strategy for digital competition. Establishing a dedicated digital regulatory agency with the mandate to enforce such pro-competition legislative proposals would go a long way in improving coordination and oversight. Instead of being stagnant, the U.S. can seize the opportunity to shape, rather than follow, global digital governance norms. Oversight should balance innovation and accountability, ensuring that competition rules serve both economic growth and the public interest.
